ABSTRACT In order to improve the image encryption system's ability to resist plaintext, noise, and data loss attacks, in this paper, a new plaintext-related and chaos-based image encryption scheme is proposed, which includes two rounds of encryption operations. The block parity checking, performed in the first round of encryption, is used to associate the plaintext information with a secret key so that the encryption scheme can resist plaintext attacks. Moreover, repetitive coding, which is adopted in the second round of encryption, is used to protect the plaintext-related parameters against noise and data loss attacks. Meanwhile, a highspeed digital chaotic sequence generator based on permutation polynomials and residue number system is also presented. The detailed performance evaluations, including key space, key sensitivity, differential attack resisting ability, anti-noise ability, correlation coefficient, and information entropy, show that our scheme not only possesses the properties of good randomness and large key space but also has a high degree of robustness against plaintext, noise, and data loss attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital image encryption plays an important role in user information security and network image transmission [1] . In recent years, many new encryption schemes for images have been proposed, including the techniques of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) sequence encoding [2] , [3] , XOR Cipher [4] , partitioned cellular automata [5] , 2D compressed sensing [6] , lifting wavelet transforms [7] , cosine number transform [8] , Multi-resolution Singular Value Decomposition (MSVD) in Discrete Cosine Stockwell Transform (DCST) domain [9] and chaotic-based encryption algorithms [10] - [13] , etc. Chaotic systems have many excellent characteristics such as unpredictability, initial value sensitivity, and mean ergodicity. Due to these inborn properties of chaotic sequences, researchers have proposed many new image encryption schemes and zero-watermarking technique based on classic chaotic mappings, such as Logistic, Tent and Sine mappings [10] - [12] , [14] . Chaotic sequence generation method plays an important role in cryptosystem, many new chaotic mappings have been constructed in recent years. For example, Zahmoul et al. [13] proposed a new chaotic mapping by using
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Beta function. Zhu et al. [1] constructed a new hyper-chaotic system by compounding two different hyper-chaotic systems in a random way. Natiq et al. [15] presented a new 3D Multiattribute Chaotic System (MACS), which has self-excited and hidden attractors. Harris Company [16] proposed a method of constructing a digital chaotic system based on Residue Number System (RNS) and specific polynomials. However, in [16] , the details of the polynomial selection method were not introduced, and the same polynomial was required for each residue channel. Hence, the space of parameter selection in sequence generation was limited. To address this problem, we proposed a chaotic sequence generation method by combining RNS and permutation polynomials in [17] . In our method, the requirement of same polynomial for each residue channel is not necessary. The performance evaluations for the chaotic sequence in [17] showed that our generation method has similar random performance with that of Harris company. However, our method has more flexible choices in polynomial construction. Therefore, our method has larger key space when it is used in encryption system. Based on this chaotic sequence generation method, a new plaintext-related image encryption method is further proposed in this paper.
A good digital image encryption system should be not only robust against brute force attacks, but also able to resist plaintext and noise attacks. The robustness against brute force attacks requires that the encryption system has a large-enough key space. For the resistance against plaintext attacks, the encryption system needs to have good plaintext sensitivity. Due to the low sensitivity to plaintext, many proposed encryption methods have been cracked by various plaintext attacks. For example, Wu et al. [18] took chosenplaintext attack to recover the key stream of the image encryption method proposed in [19] . Wu et al. [18] also made an improvement that related the confusion phase not only to the secret key but also to the characteristic of plaintext, which significantly enhances the systems' ability of resisting plaintext attacks. In [20] , the encryption scheme was attacked by Zhang et al. [21] successfully, due to that the unchanged key for different plain images made the chaotic sequence fixed. Zhu and Sun [22] cracked Wu's encryption scheme [23] by using chosen-plaintext attack. In order to increase the secret key sensitivity to plaintext, Zhu and Sun [22] used SHA-3 algorithm to generate a plaintext-related parameter for modifying the secret key. Hua et al. [24] inserted a circle of random data around the plaintext image. With this method, significant differences could be made between the obtained ciphertexts, even for the same plain image. Cao et al. [25] proposed a novel encryption scheme which changed the initial state value of the chaotic system by using the middle cipher obtained in the encryption process. Their image encryption method indeed has the ability to resist plaintext attacks. However, the encryption scheme in [25] was not very well in resisting the noise and data loss attacks. In other words, a minor modification of the cipher may result in decryption failure. The reason might be that the initial condition of chaotic sequence generator is associated with the ciphertext in the decryption process. Liu et al. [26] directly used the mean value of plaintext to change the initial state of chaotic iteration polynomial. This method can effectively resist plaintext attacks, but it requires these mean values to be sent to the decryption system separately. Chen et al. [27] indicated that transferring plaintext-related parameter separately makes the system working in One Time Pat (OTP) fashion and increases much implementation complexity for practical applications. So, it is necessary to hide the plaintextrelated information into chipertext for image encryption. For example, Ma et al. [28] proposed a reversible data hiding scheme based on code division multiplexing, this method can embed the plaintext-related data into the cipher image.
To enhance the ability of resisting plaintext attacks, in this paper, we propose a method to extract the plaintext information and associate this information with the secret key. Our method contains four steps. The first step is to use the chaotic sequence generated by the initial secret key to scramble the plain image pixels. After the scrambling operation, we divide all the bits of each pixel into different blocks and set the number of blocks equal to the bit width of a pixel. Next, parity checking is performed for each block. The last step is to use all the parity bits to compose an offset of initial state values in the secret key, and the modified key is used for diffusion in the first round. Thus, if one bit of plaintext is changed, the corresponding secret key will be different. In addition, to protect the plaintext-related parameter, the parameter is duplicated for multiple times and inserted at the end of the ciphertext obtained by the first encryption process, and then encrypted in the second encryption process.
In Section V, the detailed performance evaluations and comparisons are performed. We use chi-square test to statistically confirm the encryption quality, all of the experimental results are smaller than the theoretical value, which is 293, hence, the histogram of the ciphered image is uniformly distributed. In addition, Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) is adopted as the metric to evaluate the performance against noise and data loss attacks. Results show that when 0.05% salt and pepper noise is added, the PSNR of the decrypted image is about 54.644. When 0.05% data is lost, the corresponding PSNR is about 57.416. Besides, the visual effects of the decrypted images are not seriously distorted. Only a small amount of noise is evenly distributed on these decrypted images. As for the performance evaluation of resisting plaintext attacks, we use the Number of Pixel Change Rate (NPCR) and Unified Average Changing Intensity (UACI) as the metrics, all of the experimental values lie in the ideal interval. These test results show that the encryption scheme can defend the differential attack effectively. At the same time, the secret key space, key sensitivity, correlation and the information entropy are also analyzed and evaluated. All of the test and comparison results show that our encryption method has good encryption effect and robustness.
The contributions and novelties of this manuscript are as follows: (1) We propose a novel chaos-based image encryption method, whose chaotic sequence generators are based on RNS and permutation polynomials over finite fields. (2) We propose a method based on block parity checking to associate the plaintext with the secret key, so that the key stream relies on not only the secret key, but also the plaintext information. This method greatly improves the secret key sensitivity to plaintext. (3) We duplicate the plaintext-related parameter and insert them at the end of ciphertext obtained by the first encryption process. That enhances the performance in resisting noise and data loss attacks.
The rest arrangements of this paper are as follows. In Section II, we present the basic idea of a chaotic sequence generator scheme based on RNS and permutation polynomials over finite fields. In Section III, we give the detailed steps of our chaos-based image encryption scheme. In Section IV, the encryption effects and encryption algorithm are analyzed. In Section V, the detailed performance evaluations and comparisons are performed. Section VI is the conclusion of this paper.
II. GENERATION METHOD OF CHAOTIC SEQUENCES BASED ON RNS AND PERMUTATION POLYNOMIALS
In order to improve the efficiency of the digital image encryption system, we should try to make the chaotic sequence generation method simple and efficient. Generally, iterative operation is essential for most of chaotic sequence generation methods, and the bit width of iterative operation in its implementation is closely related to the sequence period. Periodic expansion is usually necessary for some common chaotic mappings, such as Logistic, Tent and Chebyshev mappings, but this will increase the complexity and make it hard to obtain sequence periodicity accurately. On the other hand, the excessively large calculation of bit width increases the iterative boundary in hardware implementation, which makes it hard to achieve the high speed sequence. This will reduce the encryption efficiency. The chaotic sequence generation method based on RNS and permutation polynomials has excellent benefits such as large key space, good randomness, etc. Meanwhile, in RNS, large-bit-width calculations in Traditional Complement System (TCS) are replaced by multiple parallel small-bit-width ones, thus significantly reducing the computational complexity. As a result, a higher sequence generation rate can be achieved, leading to higher efficiency of the image encryption system. In [17] , we have presented the sequence generation method, polynomial construction method, performance evaluations and hardware implementation structure in detail. Compared with the method of Harris Corporation, the construction of iteration polynomials in [17] is more flexible. That means larger key space in encryption system.
The basic idea of chaotic sequence generator based on RNS and permutation polynomials is depicted in Fig. 1 . The L integral rings, i.e. R i (i = 1, 2, . . . , L), are generated by the iteration polynomials over L finite fields, and the elements of each ring are {0, 1, . . . . , m l − 1}. Besides, GCD(m i , m j ) = 1 is satisfied when i = j. Since the iterative polynomial f l (x) is a permutation polynomial over the finite field F q l , Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) can be used to map the vector In Fig. 1 , the permutation polynomial construction method and CRT mapping are the basis of generating sequences with good randomness and long period. However, since the large modulo operation of the original CRT is inefficient in practice, the optimization for CRT is necessary. The optimized CRT is shown as
where
where L represents the number of iterative polynomials. Each iterative polynomial corresponds to the loop R i in Fig. 1 , and r l,j ( l = 1, 2, . . . , L, j = 1, 2, . . . , k) represents the coefficients of those polynomials. Parameter m i (i = 1, . . . , L) denotes the residue radix, and x l,j is the iteration variable. In this paper, we employ cubic polynomials to generate the desired chaotic sequences using the method depicted in Fig. 1 .
III. IMAGE ENCRYPTION SCHEME
As discussed in the Section I, there are two problems in some encryption schemes. (1) Some encryption system is vulnerable to plaintext attacks, since its secret key is unchanged in the encryption process for different plaintext.
(2) Some encryption system may fail to recover the plain images, when its plaintext-related parameter is modified under noise and data loss attacks. For the first problem, we perform block parity checking for the plaintext, and then use the parity check result as offset of initial state values to improve its sensitivity to plaintext. In this way, the key stream is related to not only the initial key but also the plaintext. For the second problem, we use repetitive coding to protect the plaintext-related value, so that it can be recovered from the ciphertext when it suffers noise or data loss attacks. The diagram of our encryption scheme is shown in Fig. 2 , which comprises three phases: chaotic sequence generation, the first round encryption process and the second round encryption process. The basic principle of chaotic sequence generator has been introduced in Section II, and the secret key contains the coefficients of polynomials, the residue radixes and the initial state values. For chaotic sequence generation, in order to associate the secret key with the plaintext and enhance the decryption system's defensive ability against noise and data loss attacks, we use two chaotic sequence generators. Except for the initial values, we apply two identical keys to these two chaotic sequence generators. The initial state values of one generator are only related to the secret key, while those of the other generator are related to plaintext information. The first round of encryption process contains scrambling and diffusing operations. The chaotic sequences used for scrambling and diffusing are generated by chaotic sequence generator 1 and generator 2 respectively. On the other hand, in order to enhance the flexibility of the encryption system, it is unnecessary to transmit the plaintextrelated parameter separately. So, we insert the plaintextrelated parameter at the end of the ciphertext obtained in the first encryption process. In addition, to protect it in noisy channels, we duplicate it multiple times before insertion. However, this will lead to the inhomogeneous distribution of ciphertext histogram, and the plaintext-related parameters will be exposed easily. Hence, the second round of encryption is required. The second round of encryption process includes the repetitive coding, scrambling and diffusion operations. After inserting repetitive codes, the additional scramblingdiffusion process maintains a uniform distribution of the ciphertext's histogram, and hides the plaintext-related information in the final ciphertext. Therefore, it enhances the security of the encryption system. Generally, more encryption rounds will lead to better security of the encryption system, but larger implementation complexity. In this paper, we only take two rounds of encryption in the subsequent tests and performance analysis.
A. SECRET KEY GENERATION
According to (2) , for a k-order permutation polynomial, there are k + 3 configurable variables, which includes k + 1 polynomial coefficients, an iteration initial value and a residue radix. Supposing a chaotic sequence generator has L iteration channels, the maximal key space is about 2 (k+3) * L * W , where W is the average iteration width of all channels. Therefore, the secret key is 324 bits if we select 6 cubic permutation polynomials with 9-bit average width to generate chaotic sequences. In the test cases of this paper, we randomly select 6 cubic permutation polynomials with the longest iteration period as (3) .
The period of chaotic sequence generated by (3) is M = 251 × 347 × 443 × 467 × 479 × 503 ≈ 2 52 . Chaotic sequence generator 1 directly uses the secret key to generate chaotic sequences, but the initial state values of chaotic sequence generator 2 should be added to the plaintext-related parameter. That is,
where x 0 is the chaotic initial state value vector
, offset is the result of block parity checking, x 0 is the modified initial state value vector.
B. PIXEL SCRAMBLING
As chaotic sequences have excellent randomness, they are commonly used to scramble pixels [13] , [26] , [29] . In this paper, we sort chaotic sequences to generate index vectors, and then use these index vectors to scramble image pixels. Suppose the size of the plain image is M × N (for the purpose of simplicity, in the following context of this paper, we omit the symbol '' ×'' and denote ''M × N '' as ''MN ''). The detailed scrambling steps are described as follows:
Step 1: Scan the image to be scrambled progressively, and convert the image pixel matrix into a 1D sequence, which has a length of l.
Step 2: Iterate chaotic sequence generator i for l times to obtain the needed chaotic sequence S with the length of l. Then, quantify its values from 0 to l − 1 through S = S mod (l), where l is l 1 or l 2 .
Step 3: Since S is not strict uniformly distributed in the range of [0, l − 1], S cannot be directly used to scramble the pixels. Therefore, we sort it in ascending order, and use the indexed values to compose the scrambling vector I. If there are values in S are the same, the index values of I are still in the order of the original values.
Step 4: Scramble the plain image sequence PS to get the scrambled sequence D as
In our scheme, we perform two rounds of scrambling process, both of which have the same steps. Chaotic sequence generator 1 iterates for l 1 (l 1 = MN ) times to generate the sequence S 1 , which is used to perform the first round scrambling operations, and obtain the scrambled sequence as D 1 . Chaotic sequence generator 2 iterates for l 2 times to generate the sequence S 2 , which is used to do the second round scrambling operations, and obtain the scrambled sequence as D 2 .
In order to clearly illustrate the pixel scrambling process, we give a numerical example as follows. Suppose the size of the plain image is 3 × 3, and its pixel matrix is
After step 1, we get the plaintext sequence PS = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] . The process of generating scrambling index vector I is shown in Fig. 3(a) , and the process of scrambling PS is shown in Fig. 3(b) . 
C. BLOCK PARITY CHECKING AND REPETITIVE CODING
After the first round of scrambling process, we perform block parity checking for the scrambled pixels. Supposing the plaintext grayscale is h, in order to keep the parity results consistent with the pixel bit width of the plaintext, we group the plaintext into log 2 (h) blocks ( . denotes round up), and obtain the log 2 (h) parity bits. The detailed description of the block parity checking process is as follows:
Step 1: Convert the scrambled sequence D 1 into a 2D binary log 2 (h) × L matrix, where each column represents a pixel. Then, group the bits of each pixel into different blocks as Fig. 4 .
Step2: Perform parity checking for these blocks, and these parity checking results compose a decimal integer as the offset.
To illustrate the above process clearly, we give a numerical example in Fig. 4 , where D 1 denotes the scrambled sequence obtained in the first round of encryption process. Each pixel in D 1 is converted to an 8 × 1 vector from LSB to MSB, and each dashed circle represents a parity checking block. The right side of Fig. 4 is the parity checking result offset, which is composed by the generated parity bits {B 8 , B 7 , . . . , B 1 } = {00000001}(binary) = 1(decimal).
It can be seen from Fig.4 that even if only one bit has been changed in the plaintext, the corresponding offset will be totally different. Therefore, the secret key sensitivity to plaintext is enhanced, and the robustness against plaintext attacks is also greatly improved.
On the other hand, in order to improve the performance of resisting noise and data loss attacks, repetitive codes are used after the first round of encryption to protect the parity checking result. That is to duplicate the offset multiple times and insert the duplicated results at the end of the ciphertext, which is obtained in the first round of encryption. The upper bound of the error probability P e caused by the decoder [31] can be calculated as
where t denotes the repeating times and P is the pixel error probability of ciphertext. In our encryption system, as the error pixels are encrypted again by the first round of decryption, the repetitive codes with repeating times t is able to correct at least d errors as
Assuming the pixel error probability P is 0.25, the error probability diagram of P e is shown in Fig. 5 , where X axis denotes the repetitive times, and Y axis denotes the P e . it can be observed that P e can reach the order of 1e −14 when t equals to 200. Therefore, 200 is enough for repetitive codes to reduce the error probability.
D. DIFFUSION
Different from the scrambling operation, diffusion does not change the positions of pixels, but changes the value of each pixel and hides the plaintext information in the ciphertext as much as possible. Supposing the grayscale of plaintext is h, the detailed description of diffusion is as follows:
Step 1: Iterate chaotic sequence generator 1 and 2 for l 2 and l 3 times respectively to generate the chaotic sequence S 2 and S 3 , and map their range to [0, h−1] through S = S mod h. Step 2: Use chaotic sequences S 2 and S 3 to diffuse the scrambled sequence D 1 and D 2 respectively, and obtain the diffused sequences C 1 and C 2 . The diffusion process is shown as
where, C is C 1 or C 2 , D is D 1 or D 2 , and l is l 2 or l 3 .
The two rounds of diffusion process are performed with the same steps. In the first round of diffusion, the chaotic sequence generator 2 iterates for l 3 (l 3 = MN ) times to get the chaotic sequence S 3 by using the modified key, thus obtaining the diffused sequence C 1 . In the second round of diffusion, the chaotic sequence generator 1 iterates for l 2 times to generate S 2 by using the secret key, thus to obtain the diffused sequence C 2 . Because repetitive coding is performed after the first round of encryption, the length of the sequence to be encrypted in the second round of encryption is increased to MN + t. Therefore, l 2 = MN + t.
E. DECRYPTION PROCESS
The flow chart of decryption process is shown in Fig. 6 , we briefly describe the decryption process as follows:
Step 1: Scan the received ciphertext progressively, and get the ciphertext sequence as E = (E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E MN +t ).
Step 2: Iterate the chaotic sequence generator 1 for MN + t times to generate the chaotic sequence S 2 and S 1 by using the secret key, where S 1 = S 2 (1 : MN ).
Step 3: Quantify S 2 to the range of [0, h), and inversely diffuse C 2 to obtain the recovery sequence D 2 , the process is denoted as (10).
Step 4: Use chaotic sequence S 2 to generate index vector I 2 , and then perform inverse scrambling operations to obtain the recovery sequence C 1 according to (11) .
Step 5: To acquire the plaintext-related information, we extract the end of sequence C 1 (C 1 (MN + 1), C 1 (MN + 2). . . . .C 1 (MN + t) ) to decode the repetitive codes, which is the desired plaintext-related information. Based on ''majority principle'' decoding method, the numerical value with maximum frequency is the correct offset.
Step 6: Perform the second inverse diffusion operations, iterate chaotic sequence generator 2 for MN times to generate the chaotic sequence S 3 , and quantify its range to [0, h). Then, use the quantified sequence S 3 to inversely diffuse (C 1 (1), C 1 (2), . . . , C 1 (MN )). Lastly, obtain the recovery sequence D 1 . The operation is similar with step 3.
Step 7: Sort S 1 to obtain the index vector I 1 and use I 1 to inversely scramble the sequence D 1 , then obtain the decrypted sequence PD. The process is similar with step 4.
IV. ENCRYPTION EFFECT AND ALGORITHM DISCUSSION

A. ENCRYPTION EFFECTS
The encryption effects of our scheme are provided in this section. The coefficients of the iterative polynomials and the initial state values are randomly selected according to (3) , and these parameters compose the secret key as 
We select image 'Binary' with the size of 256 × 256 and 'Lena' with the size of 512×512 as test cases. The encryption effects are shown in Fig. 7 . From Fig. 7 (a) to Fig. 7 (c) , they are plaintext, ciphertext, and decrypted image respectively. It can be seen that the encrypted images become noise-like images, and the decrypted image is identical to the plaintext. As a result, our encryption and decryption algorithm is effective.
B. ALGORITHM DISCUSSION
In this section, we will analyze the image encryption algorithm as follows.
(1) In sub Section III. C, the number of blocks equals to the image pixel bit width, which ensures that all bits of each pixel are allocated into different blocks. Furthermore, one bit change will result in different parity checking results. Thus, our method has good plaintext sensitivity.
(2) Researchers have indicated that the key-stream should be associated with the plaintext. In that way, the cryptosystem can resist plaintext attacks [18] , [21] , [22] . In order to make our encryption system be resistant to plaintext attacks, we introduce the block parity checking to associate the secret key with plaintext.
(3) Plaintext-related parameters in [22] and [26] need to be transmitted to the decryption system separately through the secret channels. However, in our encryption scheme, we hide the plaintext-related parameters and transmit them along with the ciphertext. Besides, by using the repetitive coding, the plaintext-related parameter can be recovered under the noise and data loss attacks.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
In order to evaluate the performance of the encryption scheme proposed in this paper, we select the test images from the USC-SIPI 'Miscellaneous' image database. Performance evaluations includes key space, key sensitivity, noise and data loss attacks, differential attack, ciphertext histogram, correlation coefficients and information entropy. Meanwhile, we compare the performance of our scheme with some state-of-the-art papers.
A. KEY SPACE ANALYSIS
In this paper, we select 6 iteration polynomials and each polynomial has 6 parameters. So, the initial secret key has 36 parameters, the average width of each parameter is 9 bits. Therefore, the length of the secret key is about 324 bits and the key space is 2 324 , which satisfies the demand proposed by Alvarez and Li [30] . That is the key space should be greater than 2 100 to be able to resist brute force attacks.
B. KEY SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
For an encryption system with good initial key sensitivity, the keys with one bit difference are able to generate totally different ciphered images, thus, causing the decryption to fail. To test the key sensitivity, we choose 'Lena' grayscale image as the test case, and select two secret keys with only one bit difference in the sixth channel's initial state value, i.e. (x 6,0 ) key1 = (110010) binary = (50) decimal , (x 6,0 ) key2 = (100010) binary = (34) decimal . Fig.8 shows the key sensitivity in the encryption process. Fig.8(a) and Fig.8(b) are the encryption results of key1 and key2 respectively, we denote them as K 1 and K 2 . Fig.8(c) is the absolute value of the difference between Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b) . It can be seen that the encryption results are totally different. Fig. 9 shows the key sensitivity in decryption process, where Fig. 9(a) and Fig. 9(b) are the decipher results of K 1 by using key1 and key2 respectively. Fig. 9(c) is the decrypted image of K 2 with key1. It can be observed that the decryption will fail even if one bit of the decipher secret key is changed. These test results indicate that our scheme has good key sensitivity.
C. HISTOGRAM ANALYSIS
Statistical analysis is one of the common cryptanalysis methods. The uniformity of cipher's histogram indicates the robustness of the encryption system to statistical analysis. Fig.10 shows the histograms of plain images and ciphered images. The histogram of the cipher image becomes uniformly distributed. It indicates that the cipher image has good randomness.
However, the visual effect of histogram is not enough to confirm the randomness of cipher image's pixel values [32] . To evaluate the uniformity of histogram quantitatively, we take the chi-square test as a metric. The definition VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 8. Key sensitivity in the encryption process: (a) K1 = Enc(P,key 1), (b) K2 = Enc(P,key 2), (c) K1 − K2 . of chi-square is as
where Q is the grayscale (Q = 256 in our scheme), o i is the observed occurrence frequency of each level on the histogram of the ciphered image, and e i is the expected occurrence frequency of the uniform distribution, M × N is the length of an image sequence. For an ideal image encryption system, the experimental chi-square value should be less than the theoretical value. With the significance level of 0.05, the theoretical chi-square value is 293 [32] . The chi-square test results and pass rate are listed in Table 1 . All the test images passed the test, it shows that our scheme has good encryption effect.
D. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST NOISE AND DATA-LOSS
An ideal encryption system should reduce the impact caused by the change of pixels on the decrypted images [33] . In order to test the ability of our scheme in resisting noise and dataloss attacks, we take a 512 × 512 'elaine' image as the test case. Fig. 11 shows the decrypted images under different percentage of data loss attacks. Fig. 11 (a) represents cipher images with about 1%, 2%, and 5% data loss of our scheme, the corresponding decrypted images are shown in Fig. 11 (b) . Fig. 11 (c) represents cipher images with about 1%, 2%, and 5% data loss of [25] , the corresponding decrypted images are shown in Fig. 11 (d) . Fig. 12 (a) and Fig. 12 (b) are decrypted images with 1%, 2%, 5% salt and pepper noise of our scheme and scheme of [25] respectively. As can be seen from Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 , when cipher images suffer salt and pepper noise or data loss attacks, the decrypted images of our scheme still maintain most of the original image information with only small uniformly distributed noise. However, the decrypted images of [25] almost lose all image information. In addition, Peak Signal-to-Noise (PSNR) is proposed in [34] to quantitatively measure the difference between the original plain image P and the decrypted image PD. Let the size of test image be MN , PSNR can be calculated as PSNR = 10 × log 10 2
where, E denotes the bit width of image pixels, and MSE is defined as (16) .
Higher PSNR indicates that two images have more in common with each other. If PD is the same as P, the PSNR of them approaches infinity [24] . To test ciphertext's robustness against noise, firstly, we add different percentage of salt and pepper noise into the ciphertext, and then calculate the PSNR 30352 VOLUME 7, 2019 values respectively. The results are shown in Table 2 . It can be concluded that, with the percentage of salt and pepper noise increasing, the corresponding PSNR becomes smaller. Thus, the difference between the plaintext and the ciphertext is larger. Besides, we take the image 'elaine. 512' as the test case, and provide a comparison of the anti-noise ability among schemes of ours and those of [12] , [24] , and [25] in Table 3 . It can be observed that PSNR scores of our scheme are larger than other algorithms, this indicates that our scheme has good anti-noise performance. The encryption method of [25] does not consider the interference of noise, and its chaotic initial condition depends on the ciphered image in the decryption process, hence, the PSNR values are low even under little noise attack.
In addition, to test the anti-data-loss ability of our scheme, we set a fixed portion of pixels to zero in the front part of the ciphertext, and then calculate the PSNR values of the decrypted images according to (15) and (16) . The results are shown in Table 4 , from which we can see that encryption schemes, which are suffered from data loss and noise attacks, have similar PSNR results. In other words, higher percentage of data loss will result in lower PSNR values. Table 5 gives a comparison of the robustness against data loss among the schemes of ours and those of [12] , [24] , and [25] , where 'elaine. 512' is the test case. It can be interpreted that the antidata-loss performance of our scheme is better than that of the scheme in [12] and [24] , evidently better than that of [25] .
E. ABILITY OF RESISTING DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK
Differential attack is one of the classical attacks, which is a chosen-plaintext attack. The minor change of the original image is used to find out the relationship among the two VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 11. Performance of resisting data loss attacks: (a) ciphers of our scheme with 1%, 2% and 5% data loss, (b) the corresponding decrypted images of our scheme, (c) ciphers of [25] with 1%, 2% and 5% data loss, (d) the corresponding decrypted images of [25] .
ciphered images and the original images [35] . NPCR and UACI are usually employed to quantitatively evaluate the anti-differential attack ability of an encryption system. NPCR is mathematically defined as
where L is the number of pixels of the image. D(i, j) is defined as
where C 1 denotes the cipher image directly generated by original plain image, C 2 denotes the ciphered image from the 30354 VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 12. Performance of resisting noise attacks: (a) decrypted images of our scheme with 1%, 2% and 5% salt and pepper noise, (b) decrypted images of [25] with 1%, 2% and 5% salt and pepper noise. plain image with one pixel being changed. UACI is defined as
where H denotes the largest supported pixel value of plain image, in our scheme, H = 255. Wu et al. pointed that images with different size have different ideal NPCR and UACI test values, and they established the statistical hypothesis of NPCR and UACI tests in [36] . The hypothesis of NPCR with α -level significance is
In (20) , µ N is the ideal value of NPCR, µ N = F/(F + 1), where F is the maximal expected pixel value, (F = 255 in our scheme). When NPCR < N * , we reject H 0 , otherwise, we accept H 0 . The critical value N * is defined as
where −1 (.) is the inverse cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution N (0, 1). The hypothesis with α-level significance for UACI is
where we reject H 0 , when UACI / ∈ u * − α , u * + α , otherwise, we accept H 0 . µ u = F(F + 2)/(3F + 3) and µ u is the ideal VOLUME 7, 2019 UACI value. The critical value u * − α and u * + α are defined as
For each test image, we randomly modify one bit of a pixel to generate a new plaintext image, and then encrypt them using our scheme and the schemes of [12] , [25] , and [24] respectively. We directly use their NPCR and UACI scores in [12] and [25] . As for [24] , we implement it in MATLAB 2014a and calculate the NPCR and UACI results. The NPCR and UACI results are shown in Table 6 and Table 7 respectively. There are 6 images with the size of 256 × 256, 15 images with the size of 512 × 512, and 2 images with the size of 1024 × 1024. In Table 6 and 7, the superscripts of images represent the image size, where 1, 2 and 3 denote the size of 256 × 256, 512 × 512 and 1024 × 1024 respectively. We can see that the difference between our test results and the other algorithm is very small. Table 8 and Table 9 are the pass rate under the significance level α = 0.05. Most cipher images of our scheme can pass the NPCR and UACI tests, it indicates that our scheme can defend differential attack. 
F. CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Since attackers can access information from the neighboring pixels of the ciphertext, an encryption system with good security should try to reduce the correlation between adjacent pixels of ciphertext as much as possible. The correlation coefficient between adjacent pixels is defined as
where x and y are adjacent pixels, γ xy is the correlation coefficient (γ xy ∈ [−1, 1]). Larger γ xy value means stronger correlation. We test the correlation coefficients of 15 gray images in vertical, horizontal and diagonal directions respectively, and show the test results in Table 10 . It can be seen that the correlation coefficients of our cipher images have small mean and standard deviation values whether in vertical, horizontal or diagonal dimensions. Furthermore, we compare the correlation performance of our scheme with the schemes of [12] and [24] - [26] , by using a gray 'Lena' with the size of 512 × 512 as test case. The comparison is shown in Table 11 . It can be observed that the mean value of correlation coefficients of our scheme, which is about 0.00023, is the smallest one whether in horizontal, vertical or diagonal dimensions. That means our scheme can reduce the correlation between pixels in ciphertext well.
Furthermore, in order to show the adjacent pixel pairs of image and its ciphered image visually, we take image 'elaine.512' with the size of 512 × 512 and its randomly selected 2000 adjacent pixel pairs as test cases. The distributions of adjacent pixel pairs are shown in Fig.13 . Each row from left to right are adjacent pixels in horizontal, vertical and diagonal dimensions respectively. In the first row, all dots are close to the diagonal, it indicates that, in plaintext, the correlation between pixels is strong. In the second row, all dots are uniformly distributed, showing that, in ciphertext, the correlation between pixels is significantly reduced.
G. LOCAL INFORMATION ENTROPY
Information entropy is usually used to measure the randomness of ciphertext pixels. Generally, higher information entropy means better encryption effect. The global information of an image is defined as
where h is the grayscale, n i is the occurrence frequency of a pixel whose value is i, and p i is the probability of a pixel whose value is i, L is the length of the image sequence. However, Yue et al. [37] pointed out that global Shannon entropy cannot accurately represent the randomness of an image, and images with different sizes have different theoretical maximum global entropy. Thus, local entropy (Loce) was introduced by Yue et al. [37] to measure the randomness of images both quantitatively and qualitatively. Besides, global entropy calculates all the pixels of an image, while the local entropy only calculates partial pixels, thus the computation complexity in evaluation is reduced. Recently, Loce has been widely used in measuring the randomness of ciphertext's pixel values. The calculation steps of Loce are as follows: (1) randomly select non-overlapping image blocks {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S k }, in which each block contains T B pixels. (2) Calculate the Loce H (S k ) of image block S k according to (25) and (26) . (3) Calculate the average value of H (S i ), i = 1, 2, . . . , k, as
We adopt the parameters provided in [37] Table 12 . It can be observed that the pass rate is about 80%, and the average Loce is also located in the confidence interval. Moreover, the standard deviation is approximately zero. Table 12 indicates that the cipher image of our encryption scheme has the same good randomness as that in previous studies [12] , [25] .
H. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
For image encryption system, the efficiency is important in practice, which is determined by the encryption scheme and sequence generation method. Firstly, by using similar analysis method with [25] , we analyze and compare the complexity of different encryption schemes including [12] , [24] , [25] , and ours. Supposing the image size is M × N . Since our scheme requires two rounds of encryption process, there are 10MN + 2log 2 (MN ) times floating-point operations in the scrambling process, which includes 2MN times pixel position exchanges, 8MN times block parity checking operations and 2log 2 (MN ) times sorting operations. In the diffusion process, there are 2MN times floating-point operations. In our analysis, one bit-level operation is regarded as one time floating-point operation. The results are shown in Table 13 . It can be seen that the complexity of [24] is the lowest one in these schemes, and ours is only slightly higher than it.
Secondly, our chaotic sequence generator can be implemented either in software or hardware platform. When it is implemented in software, the 6 channels' iterations can be replaced by one floating-point iteration in a 64-bit computation platform, because their total calculation bit width is about 54 bits. According to the polynomial and the sequence length required by our encryption scheme, the total number of floating-point operation is 20MN , including 6 multiplications, 3 additions and 1 modular operation. The complexity of chaotic sequence generation is shown in Table 14 . From Table 14 , we can see that [25] has the lowest complexity and ours is lower than [12] and [24] . It is worth to be reminded that [12] , [24] , and [25] needed 'Sine' computation, which usually requires more times of floating-point operations to ensure calculation precision. However, the calculation of 'Sine' function is regarded as one time floating-point operation in Table 14 . When it is implemented in hardware, we can use 6 iteration channels with small bit width to achieve high speed sequence output. Meanwhile, they can be implemented by several LUTs, so that the sequence output rate can be further increased [17] . However, due to the large iteration bit width, the other chaotic sequence generation methods might not be able to use LUTs in hardware implementation, thus making it be difficult to increase the sequence output rate.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel plaintext-related and chaosbased image encryption scheme, in which we use the digital chaotic sequence based on RNS as the encryption sequence. Besides, we propose a method to associate the plaintext information with the secret key based on block parity checking, and a method to protect the secret key by using repetitive coding. Performance analysis and test results show that our encryption method not only has good randomness and large key space to resist brute force attack, but also can resist plaintext, noise and data loss attacks. However, we think that the method for hiding the plaintext-related information into chipertext is worth more studies in the future.
